United Nations S/2013/414

Security Council

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16 July 2013
English
Original: French

Letter dated 15 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and further to the letter dated 9 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to you (S/2013/402), I have the honour to draw the attention of the Security Council to the renewed fighting in North Kivu.

1. Renewed fighting in North Kivu

Reports from North Kivu province, in particular from Mutaho, which is located some 10 kilometres from Goma, indicate that yesterday, Sunday, 14 July 2013, bloody clashes occurred between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the terrorist rebels of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) supported by specialist units from Rwanda. With this support, the M23 rebels and their Rwandan allies attacked FARDC positions in the early hours of Sunday morning. Those positions were forced to defend themselves and repel the enemy. This provocative act violates the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which requires the parties to act in a responsible manner and thus give the political process in the Great Lakes Region a chance to succeed. Such acts are also the cause of the human suffering that occurs regularly in this part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where civilians, women and children have been condemned to wander about their own country over the past two decades.

2. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda

It is apparent that the sole purpose of the letter dated 9 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the Security Council, in which it is alleged that FARDC, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the Intervention Brigade are collaborating with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), was to prepare public opinion for the current aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo that is being conducted by specialist units of the Rwandan army, acting under the guise of the M23 terrorists. The purpose of this aggression is to block the deployment under way of the Intervention Brigade.

My Government notes with regret that Rwanda, by approaching the Security Council directly, has not followed the established procedure that is applicable in such cases. At the Great Lakes Region level, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is responsible for investigating all allegations made by member countries. Rwanda has deliberately refused to turn to this regional mechanism to assess the veracity of these allegations because it knows that they are baseless.

It goes without saying that it was in good faith that the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in collaboration with Rwanda, undertook some years ago to put an end to the presence of FDLR in Congolese territory. FARDC then continued these efforts in cooperation with MONUSCO. If it had not been for the instability created by the M23 terrorists, the joint military operations of FARDC and MONUSCO could have proved so successful that there would no longer be any talk of FDLR in Congolese territory. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose civilian populations are the only victims in the region who suffer the torments of repeated FDLR attacks, has no interest in seeing its army collaborate in any way with these destructive Rwandan forces.

In other words, the FARDC do not collaborate with FDLR and do not supply them with weapons or ammunition. If Rwanda has any proof of its allegations, my Government calls on it to follow the established procedure by having recourse to the ICGLR Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.

Since the FDLR issue is one of the pretexts most often used by Rwanda to destabilize the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, my Government wishes to remind the Council of the proposal made at the most recent African Union Summit, inviting Rwanda to negotiate with FDLR. Such a solution would provide the opportunity to achieve lasting peace in the region.

Consequently, my Government urges the Security Council to:

(1) Condemn the renewed fighting in Mutaho by the Rwandan special forces, operating under the guise of M23;

(2) Order the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Rwandan special forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(3) Call on Rwanda to hold internal dialogue with its rebel groups and to submit to the democratic process like other African countries;

(4) Call on Rwanda in particular, and the countries of the region in general, to respect the commitments that they have freely made, in accordance with the provisions of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.

My Government calls on the Security Council to follow up on this letter and requests that it should be circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Ignace **Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2013/415

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2013 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the implementation of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of that resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) **Kim** Sook
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

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Annex

Letter dated 1 July 2013 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see enclosure).

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the six previous reports, it maintains the definition of the term "implementing partner" pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

> "Implementing partner", a non-governmental organization or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another non-governmental organization, and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia or the common humanitarian fund process; and/or
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Valerie **Amos**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Enclosure

Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Introduction

1. The present report is the second submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012), the successor resolution to resolutions 1972 (2011) and 1916 (2010), in which the Council first established the reporting requirement, and the seventh submission in total pursuant to those resolutions. In paragraph 8 of resolution 2060 (2012), the Council requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to it by 20 July 2013 on the implementation of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, through the support of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations having observer status in the General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

2. The present report covers the period from November 2012 to June 2013. It focuses primarily on the regions of Somalia affected by Al-Shabaab, which was listed, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Council resolution 1844 (2008) by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010.

3. As in the six previous reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580, S/2011/125, S/2011/694, S/2012/546 and S/2012/856), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and their operational implications, in addition to the mitigation measures put in place to address the politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. It is based on information gathered in a survey of relevant humanitarian agencies and clusters active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia.

Security situation

4. During the reporting period, the risks associated with the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia remained high. The continued military gains by the Somali National Armed Forces supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia notwithstanding, only a small fraction of southern and central Somalia is under the full control of the Federal Government of Somalia. In March, Al-Shabaab took control of the town of Xuddur, Bakool region, following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, marking the insurgents' first territorial gain in several months and raising concern for the protection of civilians and humanitarian workers. Reprisal attacks by Al-Shabaab led to the displacement of 2,500 civilians, arrests on allegations of affiliation to the Somali and Ethiopian armed forces and the killing of an elder. Instability in southern Somalia was further fuelled by disputes over the creation of regional administrations, notably "Jubaland". In May, the security situation in Kismaayo (Lower Juba region) deteriorated into full-blown fighting between two rival political groups, Ras Kamboni and forces loyal to Iftiin Xasan Baasto, killing some 14 civilians and wounding another 30.

5. The reporting period also saw a continuation of increased levels of asymmetrical warfare and targeted assassinations of government officials, police officers, soldiers, civilians and humanitarian workers. The number of incidents relating to improvised explosive devices continued to rise. Al-Shabaab carried out complex coordinated attacks using suicide attackers on the High Court and a Turkish Red Crescent vehicle on 14 April and on the United Nations common compound in Mogadishu on 19 June. The latter targeted United Nations humanitarian and development workers, whose work Al-Shabaab denounced as anti-Muslim and part of government counter-insurgency activities in a media statement in which it claimed responsibility for the attack. The threat of kidnapping of humanitarian personnel in Somalia remained high.

Humanitarian response, access constraints and operational implications

6. Humanitarian actors continued to respond to the 2.7 million people in need of lifesaving assistance or livelihood support. Since the beginning of 2013, almost 520,000 people have been reached with food security interventions; 189,000 malnourished children have been reached with nutrition activities; 136,000 people have been reached with essential health services; 170,000 people have been assisted with access to sustainable water; and 576,000 schoolchildren have been reached with education support. Given that pressure is mounting to support the return of the country's 1 million refugees to the region, in addition to 1.1 million internally displaced persons, humanitarian organizations are putting measures in place to ensure that returns are voluntary and safe. In camps for the internally displaced in Mogadishu, persons known as "gatekeepers" continued to control assistance flows and hinder access to aid. A polio vaccination campaign targeting 4 million people was hindered by restricted access to children in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia. The campaign was launched partly to respond to the first polio outbreak since polio was eradicated in 2007. The first cases were confirmed in Mogadishu in May. Lastly, improved access and the opening of new roads allowed humanitarian actors to reach people in some areas that were recently brought under the control of government and allied forces, such as Afmadow, Kismaayo, Baidoa, Marka and Jawhar. Insecurity and the lack of effective local administrations, however, remain a major impediment to conducting efficient humanitarian response operations. Efforts to ensure that assistance reaches the most vulnerable were further limited by difficulties in setting up effective monitoring systems in those areas. The humanitarian leadership in Somalia is looking for ways to respond effectively and enhance accountability in all areas of southern Somalia while improving sharing of information with donors.

Risk mitigation measures

7. The Risk Management Unit established a number of key functions and support mechanisms: an information-sharing platform to share and collectively manage risk; monitoring and surveillance to enhance aid effectiveness and verify information; formulation of risk analysis and risk mitigation recommendations; investigation support to respond to risk under a memorandum of understanding with the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which has resulted in the placement of an investigations liaison officer within the Unit; and training, outreach and support to provide education, raise awareness and encourage greater transparency and accountability.

8. The Unit's Contractor Information Management System database contains information on programming valued at more than $490 million and on more than 1,200 partners. Using the database, the Unit is able to flag areas of concern and track relationships between vendors and partners. Twelve United Nations agencies have contributed to the database and three more are due to sign up. The Unit has also developed common minimum standards for due diligence. They have been sent to all United Nations agencies, some partners and donors and include a declaration of conflict of interest and a declaration of non-support for a designated entity. These minimum standards and declarations are essential in identifying and managing risk. Another key issue identified by the Unit relates to contractual legal processes. To effectively address diversion and fraud, full adherence to common standards by all partners is required and sharing of information is vital.

9. A risk analysis conducted by the Unit identified risks relating to operations in Somalia, including reputational risk, fiduciary risk, misappropriation of assistance, partner management, programme management, corruption and fraud. During the reporting period, reputational risk was identified with regard to a private security company seeking to obtain United Nations contracts in an effort to consolidate its presence in Somalia. The Unit and OIOS are also undertaking risk analysis and investigation of contracts valued at more than $28 million. Evidence of fraud and diversion were identified in relation to two implementing partners (non-governmental organizations) and preliminary advisory reports were provided to the relevant United Nations agencies. The risk assessment and investigations work undertaken to date by OIOS and the Unit have identified instances in which more than 60 per cent of contract value has been diverted. Indeed, in one case relating to a non-United Nations programme (a direct donor-funded activity), it is possible that 100 per cent of funding has been diverted by the implementing partner. With the investigation continuing, information relating to the case has been provided to the relevant donor. Patterns of fraudulent behaviour and modus operandi are being identified, which in some cases include the complete fabrication of vendors, subcontracting partners or entities.

10. With increased access, the increased capacity of the Unit and all partners aiming to implement the operational objective on accountability contained in the consolidated appeal for Somalia for the period 2013-2015, the Unit expects more cases involving fraud, diversion or misappropriation of assistance to be identified. With the risk reporting, monitoring and surveillance results of the Unit highlighting high incidences of misuse of funds, the Unit signed a memorandum of understanding with OIOS for it to provide further investigation support. It is therefore vital that United Nations entities continue to ensure that all subcontracting partner information is provided by their implementing partners and vendors. The Unit is also providing support to a number of external entities, which is expected to improve accountability further. At the request of the Government, the Unit will be assisting with the development of due diligence mechanisms for the Government, in addition to providing risk management training and assistance in the development of government monitoring and investigation capacity. The Unit has been supporting the Somalia NGO Consortium and a number of international partners and donors.

11. Feedback from organizations operating in Somalia indicates that they implement a number of mitigation measures to avoid politicization, misuse and misappropriation of aid or funds, including due diligence so that partners can operate without political bias; complaints mechanisms; remote monitoring via

telephone; verification of transfer agents according to official lists; a range of quality-assurance activities to prevent aid diversion and manage risk, such as third-party verification; triangulation of qualitative data; a harmonized approach to cash transfers; a strengthened project cooperation agreement management system; third-party monitoring; assessment of implementing partners before partnership approval; and screening of partners according to regulations. United Nations agencies with significant humanitarian interventions in Somalia recorded limited instances of politicization of humanitarian aid or substantiated misuse of funds and aid during the reporting period. In addition, survey respondents noted limited numbers of incidents of politicization, misuse and misappropriation during the reporting period.

Impact of paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 2060 (2012)

12. Paragraph 7 of resolution 2060 (2012) provides that for a period of 12 months the obligations imposed on Member States in paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) are not to apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed for the present report did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 2060 (2012) on their ability to implement programmes, non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in delays in delivering humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

Conclusion

13. Humanitarian organizations continue to face impediments while delivering aid in Somalia and Al-Shabaab continues to obstruct a number of humanitarian activities, such as vaccinations, in areas under its control. Humanitarian agencies continue to deliver support to people using local partners. Owing to the implementation of enhanced due diligence measures by the Unit, the ability of the humanitarian community to identify and redress misuse and diversion of assistance has significantly increased. Improved access in southern Somalia is further expected to enhance organizations' ability to be accountable through improved monitoring, which will serve as an important deterrent to the misuse of funds, with further effective mitigation measures being introduced.

14. In the light of the foregoing, the Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 2060 (2012).

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Security Council

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11 July 2013

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Letter dated 11 July 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2101 (2013) concerning Côte d'Ivoire. By paragraph 18 of the resolution, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts until 30 April 2014 and requested me to take the necessary administrative measures.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire, I have appointed the following experts:

- Mr. Raymond Debelle, Belgium (arms)
- Mr. Eugene Rutabingwa Fatakanwa, Rwanda (customs/transport)
- Mr. Joel Salek, Colombia (finance)
- Mr. Roberto Sollazzo, Italy (diamonds)
- Mr. Manuel Vazquez-Boidard, Spain (regional)

I have also designated Mr. Vazquez-Boidard to serve as Coordinator of the Group of Experts.

I should be grateful if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Security Council

Distr.: General
11 July 2013

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Letter dated 9 July 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Finland and Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

For a number of years, the group of like-minded States on targeted sanctions (Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) has endeavoured to further fair and clear procedures in the United Nations sanctions regimes. The group is concerned that public criticism of the regimes by human rights advocates, as well as various legal actions, risk affecting the implementation of United Nations targeted sanctions.

On 10 May 2013, the group proposed to the Security Council the extension of the Ombudsperson procedure for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime to other appropriate United Nations targeted sanctions regimes, on a case-by-case basis (see S/PV.6964). In particular, the group suggested considering the Somalia and Eritrea sanctions regime in the context of its renewal in July 2013. Other States, including members of the Security Council, have come out in support of this proposal.

On 17 June 2013, Finland and Germany organized a panel discussion entitled "Mainstreaming the Ombudsperson procedure into other targeted sanctions regimes: Somalia/Eritrea as a possible case?" The event was supported by the like-minded group.

We believe that this discussion was very interesting and useful. A summary of the discussion, which was prepared under our responsibility, is attached to this letter.

As the renewal of the Somalia and Eritrea sanctions regime is coming up in July 2013, the Security Council may wish to take into consideration the arguments made at the panel discussion on 17 June. The challenges which spurred the introduction of the Ombudsperson procedure in the Al-Qaida sanctions regime are also under way with respect to other sanctions regimes. More importantly, the underlying principles apply across the board. Security Council sanctions regimes that grant fair and clear review procedures will benefit from improved credibility and effectiveness.

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We should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated among the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Peter **Wittig**
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative

(*Signed*) Jarmo **Viinanen**
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 9 July 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Finland and Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 17 June 2013, Finland and Germany organized a panel discussion entitled "Mainstreaming the Ombudsperson procedure into other targeted sanctions regimes: Somalia/Eritrea as a possible case?". The event was supported by the group of like-minded States on targeted sanctions (Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland).

The panel discussion on 17 June, designed to advance the debate in this context, brought together four experts: Andreas Zimmermann of the University of Potsdam in Germany, an expert in international law; the Ombudsperson for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, Kimberly Prost; Annette Weber, head of the research division Middle East and Africa at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs; and Antti Pentikäinen, the Executive Director of Finn Church Aid.

Three points served to guide the debate: first, the need to promote uniform application of United Nations sanctions in various jurisdictions. Second, each sanctions regime and its underlying political situation is unique, and some sanctions regimes are more suitable for the extension of the Ombudsperson procedure than others. Third, an independent review mechanism, such as the Ombudsperson procedure, is not an automatism for lifting United Nations targeted sanctions.

On this basis, the panellists were asked to explore a number of questions. Is there a need to extend the Ombudsperson procedure to other sanctions regimes? Which sanctions regimes could be "appropriate", and — possibly — which would not? Should there be a differentiation between sanctions regimes that target individuals or companies that have no link to a State or Government, and those that in fact aim at changing State or Government behaviour? Would such a differentiation be practical?

Andreas Zimmermann set out the legal framework of the discussion. He acknowledged that United Nations targeted sanctions had been created in response to criticism of the widespread humanitarian consequences of comprehensive sanctions regimes against countries. Targeted sanctions, however, raised their own legal problems: without recourse to some form of independent review, the human rights of the persons concerned, especially due process rights, were in jeopardy. He noted that judicial review of United Nations targeted sanctions by domestic courts would continue in the absence of a United Nations mechanism. As a result, courts in various jurisdictions might invalidate the implementation of United Nations sanctions measures. This would put the universal application of United Nations targeted sanctions into question.

The Ombudsperson for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, Kimberly Prost, emphasized that it is for the members of the Security Council to decide whether to extend the Ombudsperson procedure to other sanctions regimes. She explained that, for individuals subject to targeted sanctions other than in the Al-Qaida regime, a procedural recourse existed through the Focal Point. However, the Focal Point has no substantive role in the consideration of the delisting requests. By contrast, the Ombudsperson explores the facts of the cases brought before her and gives a reasoned recommendation to the sanctions committee. She bases her recommendation on an assessment whether, at the time of the recommendation, there is sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for continued listing. This, the

Ombudsperson emphasized, is not akin to a review of the Security Council's original listing decision.

Annette Weber set out the current political and security situation in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. She mentioned that the Somali opposition has a mixed track record: in some areas under opposition control, there exists a pattern of oppression and terror; in other places the opposition has managed to set up an efficient administration which breaks with traditional patterns of rule in Somalia. The new federal Government is aware of the need to find a way to engage parts of the opposition for the peace process to succeed.

Antti Pentikäinen assessed that, for certain Somali opposition actors, an avenue out of United Nations targeted sanctions could provide a valuable incentive to engaging constructively in the political process. He presented three cases in which efforts to engage the opposition had almost succeeded: in the first case, the opposition leader in question had been keenly interested in having United Nations sanctions against him lifted. In the second case, an opposition group had been ready to join the political process, only to find out that there was no consensus in the United Nations sanctions committee to lift the measures against it. In the third case, the fact that individuals leading a potential breakaway fraction were listed had hindered proper dialogue and contributed to the inability of those involved in the mediation process to keep the commitments made therein. This had resulted in further radicalization of the group.

The discussion that followed the panellists' presentations explored these aspects further. There were pointed comments opposing an extension of the Ombudsperson procedure to other sanctions regimes, arguing that further experience of the procedure was required. The United Nations targeted sanctions regimes were distinct, and it was not evident that the Ombudsperson procedure was appropriate for all of them. The Ombudsperson's role was not to address various actors' political function. Extending to other regimes her right to make recommendations, which could only be overruled by consensus in the sanctions committee or by referring a case to the Security Council, could overly complicate the Security Council's use of targeted sanctions as a dynamic political tool. On the other hand, the suggestion was made that a useful distinction could be to provide recourse to the Ombudsperson only to those individuals whose State/Government would be unlikely to approach the sanctions committee on their behalf ("diplomatic protection"), and who thus had no alternative means of obtaining a substantive United Nations review of the measures taken against them. Another question that was raised addressed the resource implications: was the potential legal and political gain worth the associated expenditure?

In response, panellists explained that legal challenges to various United Nations targeted sanctions regimes would persist as long as there was no independent United Nations review mechanism, such as the Ombudsperson procedure. The proposed distinction between "recourse for individuals through the Ombudsperson" and "recourse through Government" was seen as useful. Extending the mandate would not allow the Ombudsperson to question the way in which the Council designs sanctions regimes, nor to overturn the criteria for listing established by the Council. The political character of targeted sanctions would thus not be affected. The resources needed for extending the Ombudsperson procedure to other sanctions regimes would be limited: there was no need to establish a separate office for every United Nations targeted sanctions regime if the Security Council decided to extend the existing Ombudsperson's mandate to other regimes, on a case-by-case basis and as appropriate.